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Abstract
Import tariffs have decreased significantly over the past 30 years due to a large number of
economic integration agreements. We investigate whether national policies can be an effective
replacement for tariffs to protect domestic industry. Our focus is the European automobile
market where we show fuel taxes and vehicle emissions policy favored diesel vehicles, a tech-
nology popular with European consumers but largely offered only by domestic automakers. We
estimate a discrete choice, oligopoly model of horizontally differentiated products using Spanish
automobile registration data where we observe engine type. We show European automakers
benefited from pro-diesel fuel taxes and a lenient NOx emissions policy to earn significant profits
from diesel cars. Had regulators used policies which did not favor diesels, consumers would have
shifted consumption towards gasoline-powered imports. We show both policies amounted to
significant non-tariff trade policies equivalent to an import tariff between two to three times the
official rate.
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Fuel Taxation.
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1 Introduction
Multilateral trade agreements among countries have driven import tariffs to historic lows (Bergstrand,
Larch and Yotov, 2015). When application of traditional protectionist policies such as tariffs
and quotas becomes harder due to trade liberalization agreements, governments may resort to
less obvious regulations designed to protect domestic industries (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963;
Staiger, 1995; Bagwell and Staiger, 2001; Ederington, 2001). In this paper we consider fuel taxation
and vehicle emission regulations as examples of such policies employed by the European Union.
We argue these policies had the effect of promoting diesel vehicles among consumers and thereby
increased profits for the firms who offered diesels – European auto makers.
Our setting is the European marketplace where (largely) European diesel vehicles constitute
the majority of new car sales. We show that diesel fuel was taxed at a lower rate than gasoline
and the vehicle emissions policy chosen by European regulators targeted carbon monoxide (CO)
and carbon dioxide (CO2) but not nitrogen oxide (NOx).
1 This distinction is important as diesel
cars produce a large amount of NOx emissions but relatively little CO and CO2. Gasoline-powered
engines do just the opposite. Hence, these policies provided a competitive advantage for domestic
auto makers as foreign firms sold gasoline-powered vehicles which not only used a more expensive
fuel but also faced stricter emissions standards than their diesel-powered competition.
We use detailed automobile registration data from Spain – a country with diesel adoption
rates representative of Europe – to estimate a structural discrete choice oligopoly model of hori-
zontally differentiated goods similar to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), henceforth BLP. The
model is flexible enough to generate reasonable substitution patterns between similar products while
accounting for product characteristics known to consumers and firms but not to the researcher. Our
data have two important features. First, the sample covers the years immediately following the
introduction of the turbodiesel engine in 1989 – a major improvement in diesel technology which
proved to be very popular among consumers as diesel penetration increased from 10% to 50% in
less than a decade. Second, the sample also covers a period in which European auto makers faced
increased competition from Asian auto makers.
We show that fuel taxation and vehicle emissions standards chosen by European regulators
promoted diesels through three channels. The first channel is consumer demand where our estimates
indicate that consumers preferred vehicles with greater fuel economy defined as the number of
kilometers one can travel per euro of fuel. Fuel economy is therefore a function of both fuel
efficiency, defined as the number of kilometers one can travel on a liter of fuel, and fuel price
where the latter is impacted by fuel taxes. A primary advantage of diesel cars is their superior
fuel efficiency, traveling 20-40% farther on a liter of fuel. Since they benefited from preferential
European fuel taxes, the average diesel in our data could travel 63% farther per euro of fuel relative
1 CO and CO2 are greenhouse gases associated with global warming while NOx emissions are associated with smog
and to a lesser extent acid rain. The role of CO as a greenhouse gas is weaker than CO2 though still relevant (see
http://tes.jpl.nasa.gov/mission/climateroles).
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to a comparable gasoline-powered car. A stricter vehicle emissions policy would have eroded this
advantage as the addition of sophisticated abatement technologies required to meet such a standard
would have increased vehicle weight and decreased performance. These two policies therefore both
worked to promote diesel vehicles by enhancing the fuel savings of diesels’ superior fuel efficiency.
The second channel corresponds to the increased marginal cost required to meet a stricter
NOx emissions policy. We document several different technologies capable of reducing NOx emis-
sions though each increases production cost to diesel vehicles. In equilibrium, some of this expense
would have been passed on to consumers through higher retail prices, leading some consumers to
switch to models equipped with gasoline engines likely produced by foreign firms. By not choosing
stricter NOx emissions standards, European regulators implicitly reduced the retail prices of diesel
vehicles and increased the likelihood price-sensitive consumers would choose them.
The third channel addresses why these policies amounted to non-tariff trade policies. We
argue that the popularity of diesel cars among European consumers is a unique feature of this
market and we outline a variety of initial conditions which likely provided a foundation for the fast
adoption of diesels in Europe. As the European market constituted the bulk of sales for domestic
auto makers, developing a viable diesel technology was a worthwhile investment. Foreign firms on
the other hand chose not to invest in the diesel technology since Europe constituted just a niche
market for them.2 Policies favoring diesels thus benefited domestic firms almost exclusively.
We quantify the effects of alternative fuel taxation and vehicle emissions policies via coun-
terfactual analysis. We show that diesels were not only popular among consumers, they also
generated significant profits for European firms. Had regulators imposed fuel taxes and vehicle
emissions standards which did not favor diesel vehicles, consumers would have substituted towards
gasoline-powered Asian imports leading to significant reductions in profits for domestic automakers.
Such a shift is usually achieved by levying import tariffs on foreign products leading to less
consumption of foreign varieties. Multilateral negotiations over the past several decades, however,
have driven import tariffs to record lows thereby reducing their effectiveness as a policy tool.
We use the estimated model to measure the implicit protective value of these policies, i.e.,
their tariff-equivalence. We find that only by imposing an import tariff of between 17.1 − 27.4%,
or roughly two to three times the official rate, could European regulators have both employed the
alternative policies we consider and maintained the import share observed in the data. Moreover,
we show both policies played important roles in protecting domestic firms. We view these results
as evidence that national policies can indeed amount to significant non-tariff trade barriers.
Economists, policy experts, and politicians have all expressed concerns over the ability of
national policies to fill the void left by import tariffs but identifying and quantifying effects of
2 Kato (1997) recognizes the priority given by European regulators to CO2 over NOx as well as the disinterest of
Japanese firms to invest in an automobile technology (diesels) that was only popular in Europe. Busser and Sadoi
(2004, Footnote 2) document that since demand was small in their countries of origin, Asian manufacturers such as
Toyota chose to purchase diesel engines from other European firms as a less costly way to satisfy European demand
rather than investing in the development of diesel engines from scratch.
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non-tariff barriers (NTBs) has proven difficult. Our results therefore amount to an important and
novel contribution as, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to measure the effects of
a non-tariff barrier using an estimated structural model. The advantage of our structural approach
is that it enables us to account for the optimal equilibrium responses of consumers and firms to
alternative policies, thereby increasing the reliability of our conclusions.
We are not the first to evaluate the trade effects of policy on heterogenous firms in the au-
tomobile industry. Feenstra (1988) documents that voluntary export restraints placed on Japanese
cars during the 1980s and early 1990s induced significant quality-upgrading by Japanese firms
leading to the growth of luxury brands Acura, Infiniti, and Lexus in the U.S. market. Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) show this policy also increased profits for domestic firms and decreased
welfare for domestic consumers while leaving significant tariff revenue on the table. Goldberg and
Verboven (2001) evaluate sources for cross-country dispersion of vehicle prices in Europe prior
to 1993 while Goldberg and Verboven (2005) document that the creation of the European single
market served to reduce price dispersion. Put differently, these papers document that the existence
of different rules among European countries served to decrease competition.3 Our contribution
is to evaluate the tariff-equivalence of domestic policies and thereby demonstrate that seemingly
innocuous domestic policies can amount to significant trade policy.
We show our results are robust to a variety of alternative assumptions and that European
firms would have had to increase the fuel efficiency of their gasoline fleet significantly to compensate
for lost diesel profits under the alternative policies we consider. At the core of our hypothesis is
the idea that national governments may set seemingly innocuous rules which benefit domestic firms
at the expense of foreign ones. It is from this perspective that Volkswagen’s recent admission to
cheating on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s NOx emissions standards provides an
unique external validation for our conclusions.4
First, the episode confirms that European firms like Volkswagen earned substantial profit
from their diesel fleets and that stricter NOx standards both increase cost and decrease performance
leading to less sales and lower profits. The fact that Volkswagen management was willing to risk
severe financial punishment for cheating only reinforces this connection between diesel sales and
vehicle emissions standards.5 Interestingly, the harsh prosecution of the case in the U.S. will also
likely result in the effective disappearance of diesel vehicles from the U.S. market for a second time
in two decades due to failure to meet American emission standards.
Second, Volkswagen’s admission to also cheating on European emissions policy since 2004
elicited a very different response in Europe where regulators chose to increase the NOx ceiling
3 Jacobsen (2013), Goldberg (1998) and Ito and Sallee (2017) show the introduction of corporate average fuel economy
(CAFE) standards in the United States favored foreign over domestic firms. Thus, the domestic policy they study
actually promoted foreign imports.
4 On September 18th, 2015 the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) accused Volkswagen of
devising a sophisticated scheme to deceive authorities when testing for nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions.
5 The notice of violation, and VW’s subsequent admission, translated into an immediate 20% drop in its stock market
value due to concerns about the company’s credibility as well as an estimated $18 billion in fines.
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facing cars sold in Europe and government committed itself to not revisiting the policy until 2019.
While the company also faces financial penalties in Europe, we view this as stark evidence that
E.U. regulators understand that a stricter NOx emissions policy would have significant adverse
effects on domestic firms.
It is tempting to view our results as an indictment of European policy or proof that
European regulators explicitly designed their fuel taxes and emission standards to promote domestic
automakers. Our point is that regardless of whether it was the intent of the policymaker, the effect
of these policies served to protect domestic European manufacturers by fostering a preference for
a technology, diesel engines, that was only produced by domestic firms. We show that, provided
health and environmental externalities from diesel vehicle emissions were negligible, these policies
actually benefited consumers as they promoted an innovation (diesels) valued by Europeans due
fuel cost savings and relative affordability. Thus, it could be that these policies were enacted to
serve consumers and inadvertently also protected domestic firms.
Lastly, we ask: Did these policies violate WTO rules? The WTO considers a policy a
non-tariff barrier only if the policy is not “set at an appropriate level to achieve legitimate objectives
with minimum impact on trade” (OECD, 2005). Thus, proving European fuel taxation and vehicle
emission policies did indeed amount to illegal NTBs would have been difficult since European
regulators could have claimed the policies benefited consumers. Our results therefore provide
evidence that national policy can be an effective substitute for import tariffs and that proving such
a policy amounted to an illegal NTB is difficult.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the growth of diesel vehicles
in Europe. In Section 3 we document differences in diesel and gasoline fuel taxes as well as discuss
differences in emissions policy between the U.S. and Europe. Section 4 describes the equilibrium
model of discrete choice demand for automobiles. Section 5 describes the estimation approach,
discusses identification, and reports results. In Section 6, we use the estimated model to quantify
the equilibrium implications of alternative fuel taxes and emissions policies on the European auto-
mobile market and calculate the tariff-equivalence of the pro-diesel regulations. Finally, Section 7
summarizes our contribution. Additional results, information, and data sources are documented in
the Appendix.
2 The European Market for Diesel Automobiles in the 1990s
This section familiarizes the reader with the basic characteristics of the diesel technology; the
institutional features of the European automobile market that allowed for a swift take off of diesel
sales in the early 1990s; the evolution of the Spanish market; and characteristics of vehicles in the
data.
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2.1 A Significant Innovation – Next Generation Diesel Engines
In the late 19th century, Rudolf Diesel designed an internal combustion engine in which heavy fuel
self-ignites after being injected into a cylinder where air has been compressed to a much higher
degree than in gasoline engines. However, it was only in 1927, many years after Diesel’s death, that
the German company Bosch built the injection pump that made the development of the engine for
trucks and automobiles possible. The first commercial diesel vehicles followed soon after: the 1933
Citroën Rosalie and the 1936 Mercedes-Benz 260D. Large passenger and commercial diesel vehicles
were common in Europe from the late 1950s through the 1990s.
In 1989, Volkswagen introduced the turbocharged direct injection (tdi) diesel engine in its
Audi 100 model, a substantial improvement over the existing Perkins technology.6 A turbocharged
diesel (“turbodiesel”) engine uses a fuel injector that sprays fuel directly into the combustion
chamber of each cylinder and the turbocharger increases the amount of air going into the cylinders.
Complementing both is an intercooler which lowers the air temperature in the turbo thereby
increasing the amount of fuel that can be injected and burned. The net effect was that these
turbodiesel vehicles were significantly quieter, cleaner (no black smoke), and more reliable than
their predecessors while maintaining superior fuel efficiency and torque relative to comparable
gasoline models.7
Other European firms quickly introduced their own turbodiesels, most notably Peugeot and
Renault.8 The incredible pace of adoption of diesel automobiles, growing from 10% to nearly 60%
market share within a decade, suggests that the turbodiesel technology proved to be a significant
technological advance and that consumers gained little from waiting for additional incremental
improvements, which have been few and of minor importance.9
2.2 The Automobile Industry in the 1990s
Our data include yearly car registrations by manufacturer, model, and fuel engine type in Spain
between 1991 and 2000. After removing a few observations, mostly of luxury vehicles, our sample is
an unbalanced panel comprising 99.2% of all car registrations in Spain during the 1990s. Spain was
the fifth largest automobile manufacturer in the world during the 1990s and also the fifth largest
European automobile market by sales after Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.10 In
our sample automobile sales range from 873,057 to 1,364,687 units sold annually.
6 The 1987 Fiat Croma was actually the first diesel passenger car to be equipped with turbo direct-injection. Whereas
the Audi 100 controlled the direct injection electronically, the Fiat Croma was mechanical. The difference proved
crucial for commercial success as electronic controls improved both emissions and power.
7 See the 2004 report “Why Diesel?” from the European Association of Automobile Manufacturers (ACEA).
8 Thurk (2017) evaluates the financial implications for volkswagen due to the quick imitation of the tdi.
9 This argument was first put forward by Schumpeter (1950, p.98) and later formalized by Balcer and Lippman
(1984). More recently, it has been used by Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) to explain the half a century time span
needed for the diffusion of the much studied case of tractors.
10 See Appendix A for further details on Spanish data sources.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. New passenger car registration data from Association Auxiliaire de l’Automobile (AAA). In
panel (b), we constructed European diesel penetration (dashed line) using gross domestic product as weights (source: World
Bank Development Indicators). Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
Figure 1 (a) depicts the growth and changing composition of the Spanish automobile market.
Sales of gasoline models were flat in 1993 and 1995, about 573,000 vehicles, despite a scrappage
program in 1994, when they temporarily increased by 15%. Sales of gasoline models has grown
steadily since, but this growth pales in comparison to the growth of diesels. Initially in 1991, they
only represented about 13% of total sales but by the end of the decade diesels represented 54%
of the market, growing from 111,943 to 732,334 units sold in years 1991 and 2000, respectively.
Figure 1 (b) shows that diesel vehicles became increasingly popular not only in Spain but all over
Europe.11
In Table 1 we document the dramatic transformation in the number and characteristics
of vehicles available to consumers where we present vehicle characteristics as the sales-weighted
average to account for changes in consumer demand. At the beginning of the decade consumers
could choose from 129 different models, most of which were produced by domestic automakers. By
2000 the consumer’s choice set had grown substantially (from 129 to 229 vehicles) driven largely by
the entry of gasoline vehicles by Asian automakers.12 At the same time foreign firms were entering
the European market, domestic automakers increased their supply of diesel vehicles. In 1991 a
consumer interested in purchasing a diesel could choose from 43 different options where all but one
11 There is variance in the adoption of diesels across countries, however, as smaller countries such as Denmark were
slow adopters while France, led by Peugeot, adopted diesels earlier than Spain.
12 Asian imports include daewoo, honda, hyundai, kia, mazda, mitsubishi, nissan, suzuki, and toyota. We
use the terms “Asians” or “non-Europeans” when referring to imports. Appendix B documents that most Asian
automobiles were directly imported into the European market and that the small production of Asian automobiles
in Europe, transplants, was generally treated as imports until year 2000 because of their limited “local content”
in terms of value added. We thus treat them as imported products. chrysler sold its production facilities to
peugeot in 1978 and since then the few models sold in Europe are imported from the United States. On the
contrary ford and gm are considered European manufacturers. ford has 12 manufacturing plants and has been
continuously present in Europe since 1931. gm entered the European market in 1911, acquired the British brand
Vauxhall and the German Opel in the 1920s and today operate 14 manufacturing facilities in Europe. In both
cases, these brands have factories in Spain.
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Table 1: Car Model Characteristics by Origin and Engine Types
1991 models share price size hpw c90 mpg kpe
eu: diesel 42 12.78 12.09 73.18 3.09 4.42 53.85 46.82
eu: gasoline 68 84.08 10.85 71.03 4.09 5.31 45.10 30.05
non-eu: diesel 1 0.04 13.76 80.51 2.86 5.30 44.38 38.58
non-eu: gasoline 18 3.10 15.16 78.16 4.50 5.71 41.60 27.72
all 129 100.00 11.15 71.53 3.97 5.21 46.11 32.13
2000 models share price size hpw c90 mpg kpe
eu: diesel 75 50.95 16.19 76.32 3.14 4.55 52.35 38.18
eu: gasoline 84 37.28 14.93 73.40 3.90 5.68 41.89 24.23
non-eu: diesel 20 2.71 17.20 82.48 3.22 5.41 44.74 32.63
non-eu: gasoline 50 9.06 13.66 75.32 4.08 6.11 39.41 22.80
all 229 100.00 15.52 75.31 3.51 5.13 47.07 31.43
Notes: Statistics weighted by quantity sold. share is the market share as defined by automobiles sold. price is
denominated in the equivalent of thousands of 1994 Euros and includes value added taxes and import tariffs. size is
length×width measured in square feet. hpw is the performance ratio of horsepower per hundred pounds of weight.
c90 is consumption (in liters) of fuel required to cover 100km at a constant speed of 90 km/hr. mpg is the number
of miles one can travel on a gallon of fuel. kpe is the distance, measured in kilometers, traveled per euro of fuel.
Table A.2 in Appendix A complements this description of product features reporting statistics by market segment.
was produced by a European firm. By 2000 this consumer had 95 different diesel options, of which
75 were produced by a European automaker. Thus, not only were diesels very popular among
European consumers they were also produced almost entirely by European firms.
Diesel and gasoline versions of a particular car model share the same chassis, so a consumers
compare performance rather than car size or appearance when deciding whether to buy a diesel or
gasoline-powered vehicle. Diesel engines are about 10% heavier than a comparable gasoline engine;
have 15% to 20% less horsepower than gasoline engines; and are between one and two thousand
euros more expensive. Diesel vehicles also consume 20%−40% less fuel than a comparable gasoline
model, and given that diesel fuel is less expensive than gasoline due to differences in taxation,
the average diesel in our data travels about 63% farther on a euro of fuel than a comparable
gasoline-powered model. We observe that cars generally become less fuel efficient over the sample
(e.g., the fuel efficiency for European diesels decreases from 53.85 to 52.35 miles/gallon) but the
increasing popularity of diesels ultimately increased the average fuel efficiency (mpg) on the road
from 46.11 to 47.07 miles/gallon over the sample. We also observe that cars become on average
39.2% more expensive, 5.5% larger, and 11.6% less powerful (hpw) across time.
Our final observation relates to the market entry of fuel-efficient Asian (non-eu) vehicles,
particularly in the gasoline segment. This entry eroded market share for European firms where
domestic automakers accounted for 84% of all sales in the gasoline segment but only 37% by 2000.
Their investment in diesel vehicles and subsequent dominance in that segment, however, mitigated
the effects of foreign competition overall as European automakers accounted for 88% of all sales
in 2000, down slightly from 97% in 1991. Thus, diesel vehicles appear to have been a significant
competitive advantage for domestic automakers in fending off foreign competition.
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3 Why Are Diesels Popular in Europe?
In this section we put forward two hypotheses as to why diesel vehicles have been and remain
popular among European consumers. Our first hypothesis is that pro-diesel fuel excise taxes
enacted in the 1970s to support the transportation and agricultural industries acted as a catalyst for
consumer adoption of diesel vehicles. As turbodiesels became popular in the 1990s, an emissions
standards policy which favored diesel vehicles then served to promote the technology as well as
protect domestic automakers – our second hypothesis. We test these hypotheses in Section 6.
3.1 Preferential Fuel Taxes
There are important institutional circumstances that helped build the initial conditions that were
particularly favorable for the adoption of this new technology in Europe. The key element is the
European Fuel Tax Directive of 1973 adopted by the then nine members of the European Economic
Community gathered in Copenhagen in December of 1973, two months after the oil crisis began.
The main goal was to harmonize fuel taxation across countries so that drivers, and fossil fuel users
in general, faced a single and consistent set of incentives to save energy. Coordination also limited
the possibility of arbitrage across state lines as well as prevented countries from free-riding on
the conservation efforts of other members. Neither fuel prices nor their taxation were harmonized
overnight but the new Tax Directive offered principles of taxation that were eventually followed in
every country.
Regulators designed policy to help two economic industries particularly hit by the increase
in 1970s oil prices: road transport and agriculture. With minor modifications, these principles
have guided European fuel taxation until very recently. In 1997 the European Commission first
suggested modifying these principles of taxation to reduce the differential treatment of diesel and
gasoline fuels and incorporating elements of environmental impact of each type of fuel when setting
taxes. This change in principles was only adopted in 2013, however, so consumers faced stable and
consistent incentives favoring diesel fuel consumption for a very long period of time.13
For the purposes of this study, there are two important features of European policy. First,
is the decision by regulators to tax fuel by volume rather than by their energetic content. While
taxing fuels by volume offers a transparent criteria to monitor national policies, it also benefits
diesel vehicles as diesel fuel has a greater energetic potential than gasoline (129,500 BTU per gallon
vs. gasoline’s 114,000). Second, regulators chose to tax diesel fuel at a lower rate than gasoline –
a point illustrated in Figure 2 where in our sample the diesel tax amounted to 69% of the gasoline
tax (32 vs. 46 Euro cents per liter) leading to systematically lower diesel fuel price for consumers.
At a time when there was concern over the limited availability of low cost oil, the proponents of
diesel cited the superior fuel efficiency (i.e., miles per gallon) of diesels as a way to conserve oil.
13 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/excise_duties/energy_products/legislation/index_
en.htm for a complete description of the European Fuel Tax Directive and its evolution over time.
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This favorable tax treatment of diesel fuel fostered the sale of diesel vehicles from the
mid-1970s in Europe. By the end of the 1980s, some large passenger cars and many commercial
vehicles comprising almost 10% of the market ran on diesel fuel. Thus, when the tdi was first sold
in 1989, Europeans, unlike Americans, were familiar with diesels and did not have a particularly
negative perception of the quality of diesel vehicles.14 More importantly, Europeans did not have
to cope with the additional network costs commonly delaying the adoption of alternative fuels: by
1990 diesel pumps were ubiquitous, indeed available in every gas station, and it was easy to find
mechanics trained to service these vehicles in case repairs were needed.
Initial conditions were thus more conducive to the success of the turbodiesel technology in
Europe than in any other automobile market. And yet, it was not obvious that consumers were
going to end up embracing this new technology when volkswagen introduced the tdi engine.
Diesels are known to achieve better mileage than otherwise identical gasoline vehicles, leading to
future fuel cost savings, but they are also more expensive to purchase, presumably due to higher
production costs or because manufacturers’ attempt to capture consumer rents of drivers favoring
diesel vehicles.15 Thus, to what extent can preferential fuel taxes explain the popularity of diesels
in Europe? Had European regulators chosen to tax diesels at a higher rate, would this policy have
eliminated any chance of success for diesels in Europe?
3.2 Preferential Vehicle Emissions Standards
Next we argue that the popularity of diesels in Europe was also due to vehicle emissions standards
which favored diesel vehicles as they produce a different emission mix than gasoline models, i.e.,
diesel cars produce a large amount of NOx and little CO and CO2 while gasoline engines do just
14 See http://www.autosavant.com/2009/08/11/the-cars-that-killed-gm-the-oldsmobile-diesel/ for an ac-
count of how badly gm’s modified gasoline engines delivered poor performance when running on diesel fuel in
the late 1970s and early 1980s and how such experience conformed the negative views of Americans on diesel
vehicles for many years.
15 Verboven (2002) analyzes the price premium of diesel vehicles relative to otherwise identical gasoline model, as a
business strategy aimed to capture some of the rents of consumers with heterogeneous driving habits.
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in grams of emissions per mile driven.
the opposite. In Figure 3 we document that American and European regulators chose to target
different kinds of vehicle emissions. In The U.S. approval of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA) directed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reduce smog produced by
nitrogen oxide (NOx) and acid rain produced by sulfur dioxide (SO2). The EPA therefore chose a
policy which set stringent NOx vehicle emissions standards but weaker limits on CO and CO2.
16,17
Europeans did just the opposite and chose less stringent targets for NOx emissions and
particulate matter, PM .18,19 In 1994 U.S. Tier 1 standard allowed NOx emissions of 1 gram
per mile (g/mi) while the Euro I standard was 1.55 g/mi. By year 2000 U.S. policy allowed only
0.07 g/mi while the Euro III standard set the NOx emission level at a far less demanding 0.81 g/mi.
Similar results hold for PM . The fast diffusion of diesel vehicles in the 1990s also enabled European
authorities to choose more stringent CO2 emission standards than the United States; the goals of
local automobile manufacturers and European environmental regulators were thus perfectly aligned.
16 For simplicity we refer to the EPA setting US policy but a more accurate depiction center on the the California
Air Resources Board (CARB) as the driving force for a stricter NOx vehicle emission standard as the combination
of westerly prevailing winds, eastern mountains in California, and large population centers like Los Angeles led to
significant concerns over smog in the state.
17 The EPA set its emissions goals (Title IV-A) targeting power generating plants and established a cap-and-trade
system (Title V). The EPA also chose strict NOx emission standards for light-duty vehicles (Title II-A).
18 European authorities set NOx and PM standards for each vehicle while U.S. authorities set a fleet-wide limit. As
for CO and CO2 emissions, these depend on fleet average fuel consumption standards and are reported as realized
fleet-wide levels.
19 See Section IV of the 2001 report: “Demand for Diesels: The European Experience. Harnessing Diesel
Innovation for Passenger Vehicle Fuel Efficiency and Emissions Objectives” available at www.dieselforum.
org. The negative health effects of PM are well documented. Capturing PM is however easier and far
less expensive than capturing NOx and we will not address it in our counterfactual analysis. See The
World Bank’s report: Reducing Black Carbon Emissions from Diesel Vehicles: Impacts, Control Strategies,
and Cost-Benefit Analysis available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/17785/
864850WP00PUBL0l0report002April2014.pdf. In page 27 it indicates that the cost of complying with the most
stringent PM emissions for a 4-cylinder 1.5 L diesel engine was $1,400 in 2014.
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The differences between the U.S. and European emission standards are significant. Reducing
NOx emissions is much harder for diesel engines as the three-way catalytic converters used to reduce
emissions in gasoline engines cannot cope with the high concentrations of NOx generated by diesel
engines, e.g., Canis (2012). Thus, for instance, in the 1990s, rather than investing to redesign their
diesel engines to meet these stringent emission standards, volkswagen and mercedes chose to
stop selling their diesel models in the U.S. market in 1993 and 1994, respectively, precisely at the
time of the implementation of the U.S. emission standards mandated by the CAAA.20
Only in 2009 did the EPA finally address the issue of NOx emissions from diesel vehicles
by requiring the installation of an urea-based selective catalytic reduction (SCR) that injects an
aqueous solution into the vehicles’ exhaust stream to “scrub” NOx emissions, e.g., Appendix C.
An SCR system not only increases a car’s manufacturing cost, it also increases the vehicle’s weight
and therefore decreases fuel efficiency. There is also evidence that operating the system decreases
performance in other dimensions.21 Whether turbodiesels will remain a viable product in the U.S.
market is unclear. Moreover, the impact of vehicle emissions on vehicle sales suggests that American
emission standards amounted to a de facto ban of diesel vehicles in the U.S. market. Could then a
similar European emission policy have eliminated any chance of success for diesels in Europe?
4 An Equilibrium Oligopoly Model of the Automobile Industry
In this section we present a structural model of demand and supply to conduct our analysis. We first
present a BLP discrete choice demand for horizontally differentiated products with heterogenous
preferences over observable and unobservable automobile characteristics. We add to this a model
of oligopoly Bertrand-Nash price competition among multi-product firms. The model delivers a set
of structural equations which we use to recover the underlying demand and cost parameters.
4.1 Demand
Demand can be summarized as follows: consumer i derives an indirect utility from buying vehicle
j at time t that depends on price and characteristics of the car:
uijt = xjtβi + αitpjt + ξjt + εijt ,
where i = 1, . . . , It; j = 1, . . . , Jt; t = {1991, ..., 2000} ,
(1)
20 According to Stewart (2010), the NOx emissions level of the least polluting diesel model available in Canada,
the volkswagen Jetta (known as Bora in Europe), was 0.915 and 0.927g/mi for the 1991 and 1997 year models,
respectively. This indicates that the NOx emissions standards imposed by the EPA were indeed binding constraints
for diesel vehicles since even the cleanest diesel models barely met the 1994 U.S. emission standards and would
have generated NOx emissions thirteen times greater than the 2000 limit.
21 See the April 2016 report “Volkswagen Diesel Emissions Settlement High on Promise, Short on
Details.” (https://www.consumerreports.org/cars-vw-fix-for-diesel-vehicles/). volkswagen
argues that the fix applied to the tdi has no impact on fuel efficiency or performance
though road tests appear to contradict the company’s claim (http://www.motortrend.com/news/
diesel-fix-reduces-fuel-economy-on-european-vw-model-test-shows/).
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where we define a product j as model-engine type pair. In this Lancasterian approach, utility
depends on the set of characteristics of the vehicle purchased which includes a vector ofK observable
characteristics xjt as well as other characteristics which are known to consumers and firms but
remain unobservable for the econometrician, ξjt. Unobserved tastes of consumer i for vehicle j,
εijt, follow an i.i.d. multivariate type I extreme value distribution. Similar to Sweeting (2013) we
assume the unobserved quality ξjt evolves according the following AR(1) process:
ξj,t+1 = Fj + Sj + ρξξj,t + νj,t+1 , (2)
where Fj is a time-invariant brand (e.g., volkswagen) fixed effect that captures differences in
product quality levels across brands, Sj is a time-invariant segment (e.g., compact) fixed effect
that captures differences in product quality across segments, and ν ∼ N(0, σ2ν) are temporary
product-level demand shocks. This specification accounts for gradual unobserved improvements in
quality that are the result of investment and cumulative experience of manufacturers, a reasonable
approach when automakers are deploying new diesel models characterized by unobservable perfor-
mance features such as high torque at low r.p.m., extended durability, and great reliability. As in
Schiraldi (2011), ν represents unexpected innovations in unobserved quality that drives demand.
We allow for individual heterogeneity in response to vehicle prices and characteristics by
modeling the distribution of consumer preferences over characteristics and prices as multivariate
normal with a mean that shifts with consumer attributes:
αit = α/yit , (3a)
βi = β + Σηi , ηi ∼ N(0, In+1) . (3b)
Consumer i in period t is characterized by her income yit as well as a vector of random tastes,
ηi, distributed i.i.d. standard normal. Σ measures the covariance in unobserved preferences across
characteristics. The inclusion of these random coefficients generates correlations in utilities for the
various automobile alternatives that relax the restrictive substitution patterns generated by the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property of the multinomial logit model.
We decompose the deterministic portion of the consumer’s indirect utility into a common
part shared across consumers, δjt, and an idiosyncratic component, µijt. The mean utilities of
choosing product j and the idiosyncratic deviations around them are given by:
δjt = xjtβ + ξjt , (4a)
µijt = α/yit + xjtΣηi . (4b)
Each period t, Mt consumers each choose to purchase either one of the Jt vehicles available
or the outside option (j = 0) of not buying a new car. We normalize the value of the outside option
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to be zero.22 We therefore define the set of individual-specific characteristics leading to the optimal
choice of car j as:
Ajt (x·t, p·t, ξ·t; θ) = {(yit, ηit, εijt) |uijt ≥ uikt ∀k = 0, 1, . . . , Jt} , (5)
with θ summarizing all model parameters. The extreme value distribution of random shocks allows
us to integrate over the distribution of εit to obtain the probability of observing Ajt analytically.
The probability that consumer i purchases automobile model j in period t is:
sijt =






Integrating over the distributions of consumer income yit and unobservable consumer attributes
ηit, denoted by Py(yt) and Pη(ηt), respectively, leads to the model prediction of the market share
for product j at time t:






with s0t denoting the market share of the outside option.
4.2 Pricing
Equilibrium prices are found as the solution to a non-cooperative Bertrand-Nash game among the
competing automakers. A firm f maximizes period t profits by choosing the vector of pre-tariff
prices pwjt for all of the products in its portfolio J
f
t . Going forward we drop time subscripts for the
sake of brevity. Equilibrium pre-tariff prices (pwj ) can therefore be written as a nonlinear function
of the product characteristics (x), market shares sj(x, p, ξ; θ), retail prices (p), and markups:
pwj = mcj + ∆
−1(p, x, ξ; θ)sj(p, x, ξ; θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bj(p, x, ξ; θ)
; (8)
where pj = p
w
j × (1 + τj) and τj is the import duty applicable to model j, if any. The vector of
equilibrium euro markups bj(·) depends on market shares sj(·) and the matrix ∆(·) with elements:
∆rj(x, p, ξ; θ) =





, if products {r, j} ∈ Jf ,
0 otherwise .
(9)
22 The data does not allow us to adequately model the used car market, e.g., Gavazza, Lizzeri and Roketskiy (2014),
so our definition of the outside option combines consumers who do not buy a car with those who choose to buy a
used car rather than a new car. Appendix A documents how we account for variation of the outside option over
the economic cycle in Spain during the 1990s.
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Thus a firm f ’s optimal choice of pre-tariff prices internalizes the official tariff rate (if applicable)
as well as the cross-price elasticities of products in its portfolio (Jf ).
In estimating costs we make a common assumption that firms have Cobb-Douglas cost
functions, therefore:
log c = Zγ + ω , (10)
where Z is composed of brand and segment fixed effects as well as logged observable characteristics
while ω are cost components unknown to the researcher.
5 Estimation
We define the structural parameters of the model as θ = [α, β, γ,Σ, ρξ, σ
2
ν ] and construct the
demand-side structural error by creating quasi-differenced moments of consumer mean utility (4a)
taking advantage of the AR(1) process in which unobserved product quality evolves:
δjt(Σ, α; sjt)− ρδj,t−1(Σ, α; sj,t−1) = xjtβ − ρxj,t−1β + Fj + Sj + νjt . (11)
Define the demand-side structural error as εD(θ) = ν and the supply-side structural error
as εS(θ) = ω. We construct these structural errors as follows. First we solve for the mean utilities
δ(θ) via a contraction mapping which connects the predicted purchase probabilities in the model to
observed shares in the data for a given value of θ (see Berry, 1994 and BLP). We construct predicted
aggregate shares (7) via Monte Carlo integration using 6,000 Halton draws. The demand-side
structural error εD then follows from (11).23 Observed prices, ownership structure, and tariff rates
plus equation (8) generate marginal costs as a function of the parameter guess. The supply-side
structural error εS then follows from (10).
We make the common assumption that the product set is exogenous so that our structural
errors are mean independent of the product characteristics, i.e., E[ω|Z] = 0 and E[ν|X] = 0.24
Demand and supply parameter estimates θ = [α, β, γ,Σ, ρξ, σ
2
ν ] are recovered via a generalized
method of moments (gmm) estimator using observable product characteristics as basis functions to
construct identifying moment conditions H. The gmm estimator exploits the fact that at the true
value of parameters (θ?), the instruments H are orthogonal to the structural errors εD(θ?), εS(θ?)







23 When we observe a vehicle for the first time, the analog to (11) is εDjt(θ) = δjt(θ) − xjtβ − Fj − Sj where our
assumption is that these temporary demand shocks are also i.i.d. N(0, σ2ν).
24 There are no automobile models sold exclusively in Spain but rather all are sold across the European continent.
This reduces the concerns that product characteristic X may be endogenous and responding to local demand.
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where g(θ) is a stacked vector of the demand and supply-side structural errors and W is the
weighting matrix, representing a consistent estimate of E[H
′
gg′H].25
Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) and Dubé, Fox and Su (2012) point out that finding a global
solution to (12) is difficult since the objective function is highly non-linear so any line, gradient,
or simplex search will likely only result in a local solution. To increase the likelihood of achieving
a global minimum, we employ a state-of-the-art minimization algorithm (Knitro Interior) starting
from several different initial conditions – a strategy shown by Dubé et al. (2012) to generate the
global solution in Monte Carlo simulations.
Specification. Consumer demand includes measures of automobile performance: horsepower
divided by weight (hpw), exterior dimensions (size), fuel economy (kpe), and engine type (diesel)
where the inclusion of diesel as a random coefficient allows for different substitution patterns within
the diesel segment. We also include a linear diesel trend (diesel×trend) in mean utility which we
found helpful in explaining the increasing popularity of diesel vehicles over time. We include brand
fixed effects (e.g., audi, toyota) to account for quality differences across brands and segment fixed
effects (e.g., compact, sedan) to capture segment-specific mean utility differences beyond hpw,
size, or kpe. We simulate individual income yit from yearly census data to account for changes in
the distribution of income across time. Finally, the inclusion of a linear time trend accounts for
any variation in the remaining relative valuation of the outside option over time.
In modeling supply we assume that marginal cost is a function of logged hpw, size, and
fuel efficiency. In contrast to consumer demand we replace kpe for c90 to eliminate the effect
of fluctuations in fuel price, which has nothing to do with the cost of manufacturing engines.
Consequently, audi’s fuel-efficiency for a gasoline model A4 impacts its cost directly as measured by
c90, but demand for A4’s will also be influenced by changes in the price of gasoline (Figure 2) due to
economic factors outside of audi’s control through kpe. Similarly, we interact an index for the price
of steel, spi, with hpw and size to account for the changes in the cost of this input.26 This impacts
the value of hpw and size in supply but not demand. We also include a diesel dummy to account
for differences in engine cost as diesel engines are manufactured to withstand higher compression
ratios during internal combustion. We include linear trends gasoline and diesel to capture changes
in production marginal cost across the sample. As in the demand specification we include brand
and segment dummies to account for differences in marginal cost across these dimensions. Finally,
changes in import tariff rates are accounted for in p through pricing equation (8) while changes in
firm ownership due to mergers and acquisitions documented in Appendix A (Table A.1) impact the
∆ matrix and ultimately estimated marginal costs also through equation (8).
25 In constructing the optimal weighting matrix, we first assume homoscedastic errors and use W = [H
′
H]−1 to
derive initial parameter estimates. Given these estimates, we solve equation (12) and use the resulting structural
errors (εD, εS) to update the weight matrix.
26 As heavier cars contain more steel, we multiply weight by spi and recompute hpw.
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Parameter Identification and Instruments. The parameter estimates are pinned down in the
gmm estimation via the instruments H. The intuition into how data variation identifies different
components of θ is as follows. Mean utility parameters β and cost parameters γ are recovered using
the linear projection outlined in Nevo (2000) using equations (10) and (11). Consequently, the
mean utility vector β is identified by correlations between market shares and observable product
characteristics after controlling for persistent variation in brand (via F ), segment (via S), and
model (via ρξ). The identification of γ follows from variation in observable product characteristics
and implied marginal costs where the latter depends on variation in price and market shares via the
price coefficient α, plus the shocks to fuel price and steel prices. Given the exogeneity of product
set, the components of X and Z are sufficient instruments for β and γ.
Figure 4: Sample Variation of Household Income
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Source: Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares,
INE (Spanish Statistical Agency).
The timing of unobserved quality shocks ν makes past product characteristics valid in-
struments to identify the AR(1) persistence term ρξ and therefore, this parameter is identified by
persistence in market shares not explained a general time trend, or a specific fuel time effect,
diesel×trend. The price coefficient α is identified by changes in the income distribution over the
economic cycle of Figure 4 plus variation in prices and quantity sold over the sample period. We
instrument for price using the total number of products accounting for differences in firm portfolios.
This provides two instruments: (1) the sum of other products in the firm’s period t portfolio and
(2) the number of products produced by other firms in period t. Reynaert and Verboven (2014)
show that including the supply-side pricing decision aids in the identification of α. Residuals from
the gmm estimation are used to compute σ2ν .
The remaining parameters are the random coefficients Σ which govern product substitution
patterns among observable characteristics. Under the assumption the product set is exogenous,
a common assumption, we use variation in the product set to identify these parameters taking
advantage of changes in product characteristic space (e.g., hpw, size, kpe) plus changes in prices
and quantities to isolate these substitution patterns.
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Our specification includes a constant and an indicator for diesel engines. These pa-
rameters govern substitution within the gasoline and diesel segments, respectively. The sum of
products in and outside the portfolios of firms not only aid in instrumenting for price, they also
provide identification for the constant random coefficient. We construct the instruments for the
diesel random coefficient using the number of vehicles within fuel types as in Bresnahan, Stern
and Trajtenberg (1997): (1) the sum of other products in the firm’s period t portfolio of the same
fuel type as product j, and (2) the number of products of the same fuel type as product j produced
by other firms in period t. Thus, the random coefficient for diesel vehicles is identified by the
correlation between changes in the number of diesel vehicles in the product set and changes in
purchase shares of diesel vehicles. A similar rationale holds for the constant random coefficient
with respect to gasoline-powered vehicles.
Other random coefficients (hpw, size, and kpe) refer to continuous characteristics. We
construct instruments for these random coefficients by approximating the “optimal instruments”
of Chamberlain (1987) using the “differentiation IVs” of Gandhi and Houde (2015).27 The idea
is to use the distributions of product characteristics to identify Σ by constructing cdf’s for each
continuous characteristic based on the pairwise distances among any two products. For example, we
can construct a cdf for a 1995 Audi A4 in kpe space by looking at the distance between that model’s
fuel economy and the fuel economy of other models in that year. The addition or subtraction of
models over time then impacts this distribution. When consumers value fuel economy, orthogonality
between εd(θ) and this cdf is achieved by increasing the kpe random coefficient – a similar intuition
to the instruments used in BLP.
We operationalize this approach by replacing the large-dimensional cdfs with sample statis-






































where dkrj,t is the distance in product characteristic space k between products j and r defined as
xkr,t − xkj,t and sd(xk) is the standard deviation of characteristic k. Thus, H
k,1
jt sums the square of
27 Reynaert and Verboven (2014) further discuss instrumentation of discrete choice demand systems.
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the distances products of the same brand than product j; Hk,2jt of products of other brands; H
k,3
jt
of “close” products of any brand; and Hk,4jt of close products of the same fuel type. We follow a
similar approach in constructing the supply-side instruments.
5.1 Estimation Results
We present the parameter estimates for a logit model and our preferred the random coefficient logit
(“RC Logit”) specification in Table 2. Overall, the estimates are reasonable, statistically significant,
and congruent with the descriptive evidence of the Spanish automobile industry of Section 2.
Table 2: Demand and Supply Estimates for Different Specifications
Logit RC Logit
Coefficient Rob. SE Coefficient Rob. SE
Mean Utility (β)
constant −12.8646 (0.8857) −19.8474 (5.3107)
hpw 0.5469 (0.0734) −2.3574 (1.5000)
size 4.3136 (0.7028) 6.1807 (5.6900)
kpe 0.3822 (0.0960) 1.0342 (0.5598)
trend 0.0589 (0.0156) 0.4668 (0.1888)
diesel −1.1659 (0.2074) −10.2957 (4.8363)








price/income −1.6853 (0.0957) −2.2252 (0.0695)




ln(hpw/spi) 6.4626 (1.1368) 0.7954 (0.0478)
ln(size× spi) 20.6792 (3.6212) 2.8725 (0.1191)
ln(c90) −2.3107 (1.2663) 0.6027 (0.0431)
trend 0.0796 (0.0985) −0.0237 (0.0029)
diesel 4.1180 (2.0462) 0.4271 (0.0342)
diesel× trend −0.3082 (0.2623) −0.0057 (0.0032)
Notes: gmm J-statistic for RC Logit model is 94.67. Results based on 1,849 observations and 6,000 simulated agents per year. In the
Logit model we replace yi,t with average period t income. Estimation results for brand and segment dummies in consumer mean
utility and firm costs not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Equilibrium prices account for year-specific ownership
structure as reported in Appendix A (Table A.1).
Recall that diesel vehicles present two primary differences from gasoline vehicles: better
fuel efficiency (measurable) and greater torque at low r.p.m. (unobservable). The former we
capture via our measure of fuel economy (kpe) in consumer utility while the latter we capture by
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including diesel dummy and trend variables (diesel, diesel×trend) in mean utility. We find that
consumers do indeed value fuel economy (β̂kpe > 0) and the effect is statistically significant. This
result identifies the first channel by which the fuel taxation and vehicle emission standards chosen
by European regulators implicitly promoted these vehicles. Fuel economy (kpe) accounts for both
differences in fuel efficiency (mpg) and fuel price. A low diesel fuel tax therefore increases diesel
fuel economy relative to gasoline-powered models and increases both diesel vehicle sales and profits
for the auto makers who produce them. Stricter NOx emissions standards require modifications
to the engine which add weight and decrease performance, including fuel efficiency. Thus, weak
emission standards also increase the attractiveness of diesel vehicles by increasing fuel economy.
At the beginning of the sample consumers value diesels less than gasoline-powered cars
(β̂diesel < 0) but their perceptions of diesels increase over the decade. The increasing valuation of
diesels could reflect improvements to unobserved quality or consumers learning about the next gen-
eration diesel technology, the turbodiesel. Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to differentiate
between these two hypotheses. We also find persistence in the unobserved quality of automobiles,
ρ̂ξ > 0, even after controlling for differences in brand though temporary demand are also important
(σ̂2ν > 0). On the cost side, we find that diesels are more expensive to manufacture than gasoline
models. Marginal cost of production are also higher for larger and more powerful cars. Marginal
cost is decreasing in fuel efficiency (increasing in c90). Our cost estimates also indicate significant
efficiency gains throughout the decade for both gasoline and diesel vehicles.
Our results indicate that small, inexpensive cars tended to have less elastic demand – a
result consistent with Grigolon and Verboven (2014, Table 8) for the German automobile industry.
For example, the average estimated demand elasticities for compact, sedan, and luxury vehicles
are 2.52, 2.96, and 3.86, respectively. Thus, an automaker tended to generate more profit per
vehicle selling a compact car (44.25% average estimated price-cost margin) than a luxury car
(28.67% average estimated price-cost margin).28
Significant estimates for the hpw, size, kpe, and diesel random coefficients indicate a great
deal of heterogeneity among consumers though these estimates are smaller (in absolute value) than
the corresponding estimates on the mean utility so both components tend to be important when
consumers make purchase decisions. Interestingly, we find the random coefficient for gasoline cars
(σ̂constant) is large but insignificant indicating that other characteristics account for the majority of
the variation in car substitution patterns.
In Figure 5 we show the inclusion of random coefficients translates into reasonable estimated
substitution patterns. In panels (a-c) we compare the average cross-price elasticity among products
as we increase the product distance, dkrj,t, in characteristic space. For each observable product
characteristic we divide the product pairs into deciles and plot the average cross-price elasticity on
the x-axis. Product pairs in the left-most bins are therefore closer together than product pairs in the
right-most bins. Panels (a-c) all indicate that car models close together in characteristic space tend




where pwjt is the price set by the automaker
(i.e., does not include any applicable tariff) and ĉjt is the estimated marginal cost of producing vehicle j.
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Notes: Figures present average estimated cross-price elasticities across characteristics (panels a-c) and engine-type
(panel d). In Table E.1 we present the matrix of estimated cross-price elasticities for the most popular products while
in Table E.2 we present the “best substitute” for a select number of products.
to be better substitutes. Since diesel is a discrete variable, we show the average cross-price elasticity
within and across fuel types (panel d). Our estimates indicate that diesels are closer substitutes to
other diesels and that gasoline models are closer substitutes to other gasoline models.
In Figure E.1 we report our estimates of the brand fixed effects in demand and supply
relative to the Spanish market leader, renault. Again, results are very reasonable. German
upscale brands audi, bmw, and mercedes have higher valuations but are also the most expensive
to produce. Foreign imports tend to be relatively inexpensive to produce (e.g., daewoo, hyundai,
kia) although less so among those with higher estimated valuations among consumers (e.g., honda
and toyota). Meanwhile the old Spanish brand seat, now operated by volkswagen, is both
inexpensive to produce and relatively well valued by consumers, though both effects are small.
In Figure 6 we demonstrate the importance of the transitory demand shocks captured by
ν̂ towards predicting consumer demand. We do so by comparing the actual vehicle market shares
(y-axis) to the predicted market shares when we set ν = 0 (x-axis). As the model generates observed
demand by construction, if setting transitory demand shocks played little role setting ν = 0 would
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correspond to only small deviations in predicted demand. Graphically, this would correspond to
points concentrated on the dashed 45-degree line of Figure 6. While there is some bunching around
the 45-degree line reflecting the importance of other demand-side covariates, we also observe large
deviations indicating that transitory demand shocks are also important.
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Notes: Figure compares the actual vehicle market shares (y-axis) to
the predicted market shares under the restriction of ν = 0 (x-axis).
In Table 2 we also compare our preferred RC Logit estimation to that of a simple multinomial
logit model where the latter differs from the RC Logit model in two ways. First, it restricts substitu-
tion patterns by imposing Σ = 0 and yi,t = yit. Second, we assume no autocorrelation in unobserved
characteristic and impose ρξ = 0, σ
2
ν = 0. This restricted simple logit model still delivers many of
the qualitative results from the estimated RC Logit model, e.g., consumers favor fuel economy (kpe)
and have a negative preference for diesels which improves over time. This provides further evidence
that pro-diesel fuel taxation and vehicle emission standards promoted diesels by increasing their
fuel economy. The most notable difference between the models corresponds to price responsiveness
of consumers where in our preferred RC Logit framework consumers are more sensitive to price
than in the logit model. We therefore estimate demand to be less elastic in the logit model where
3% of car models have inelastic estimated demands. In comparison, demand estimates in the RC
Logit model yield vehicle demand curves which are always elastic.29
In summary, the estimated RC Logit model generates reasonable estimates of consumer
demand and supplier marginal cost. The estimated model also delivers reasonable substitution
patterns between products (Figure 5) and own price elasticities. We find that consumers value fuel
economy (kpe) when purchasing a new vehicle. As the fuel taxation and vehicle emission policies
we discussed in Section 3 both increase fuel economy for diesel cars, these estimation results support
our hypothesis that these policies promoted diesel vehicles.
29 Although ignoring the distinction between diesel and gasoline models, Moral and Jaumandreu (2007) find similar
demand elasticities as our preferred RC Logit estimated model.
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(b) Non-European Firms
Value of Diesels. Before moving on to testing our hypotheses as to whether preferential fuel
taxation and vehicle emissions promoted diesels and in so doing amounted to a successful strategic
trade policy, we use the parameter estimates to document that diesel cars were indeed a valuable
innovation for European firms. In Figure 7 we use our cost estimates to show that diesels generated
a significant share of the profits for European firms that increased over time. While profits from
diesels also increased for Non-European (largely Asian) firms, their contribution to profits was
substantially smaller. If we hold the consumer valuation of diesels fixed at their 1991 level by
setting βDiesel-x-Trend = 0, the importance of diesels to these firms’ decreases significantly indicating
that the improving valuation of diesels played an important role in the technology’s success.
6 Fuel Taxation and Emissions Policies as Strategic Trade Policy
In this section we use the estimated RC Logit model to test the quantitative importance of pro-diesel
fuel taxation and emissions policy. While there are many potential alternative policies we could
consider, we restrict our attention to the following scenarios. We assume European regulators
equalize fuel taxes by setting a uniform fuel tax equal to the gas tax we observe in the data.
Regarding alternative emissions policies we allow for the possibility that a stricter NOx vehicle
emissions policy could affect both the marginal cost of producing diesels and their performance.
For simplicity we assume that all diesel models require the same “abatement cost” and suffer the
same reduced performance though it is likely these effects would vary by engine and car size.
The task then is to identify a “realistic” cost and change in performance an automaker’s
diesel fleet would incur to meet the hypothetical stricter NOx emission standard. For years, a
technology to successfully capture NOx emissions at the tailpipe simply did not exist. When it
finally became available, in the late 2000s, it was still very expensive. By the EPA’s own estimates
in 2010, diesel engines could be retrofitted to comply with both EPA and California NOx emission
standards by means of a Lean NOx Catalyst at an estimated cost of between $6,500 to $10,000 per
vehicle. Lean NOx catalysts use diesel fuel injected into the exhaust stream to create a catalytic
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reaction and reduce pollution. However, these catalysts still require specific exhaust temperatures
for appropriate NOx emission control performance, and on average they reduce emissions up to
a maximum of 40%. German manufacturers bmw and mercedes were certified to be sold in all
50 states of the U.S. in 2009 only after equipping their new vehicles with the more efficient and
expensive Selective Catalytic Reduction System that injects a reluctant (a urea-based solution) into
the exhaust stream where it reacts with a catalyst to convert NOx emissions to nitrogen gas and
oxygen. This system is more effective, reducing NOx emissions up to 75% but the EPA estimated
that its retrofitting cost ranged between $10,000 and $20,000 per vehicle in 2010.30
These options for abatement technology yields a great deal of variation for how European
automakers may have responded to a more rigorous NOx vehicle emissions standards. If we assume
such a technology did in fact exist in the 1990s, the abatement cost estimates from EPA are likely
biased-upwards as they amount estimated costs for the ex post retrofitting of vehicles to meet
the stricter American emission standard. It seems likely that an auto maker making an ex ante
modification to a diesel vehicle could likely do so at a lower cost. We therefore model two scenarios
at different estimates of abatement cost in hopes of providing a reasonable range for the likely
impact of a stricter NOx emission policy. First, we assume the marginal cost of attaching an
abatement system (either LNC or SCR) to a 1990s European diesel would have been the lower
bound of the above ex post retrofitting estimates ($6,500).31 We view this estimate change in
marginal cost as a likely upper bound and refer to this scenario as “EPA.” Second, we consider
the “NONE” scenario where meeting a stricter NOx standard does not impact the marginal cost
of diesels at all. We view this scenario as a lower bound since adding abatement technology at the
very least requires the purchase and installation of a SCR or LNC system.
To evaluate the impact of stricter emissions policies on performance, we use the 2015
Volkswagen emissions scandal as guidance as these vehicles were equipped with viable SCR abate-
ment systems so the company had incurred the increased marginal cost to include the abatement
technology. The scandal therefore highlighted the impact of a stricter NOx vehicle emissions on
engine performance as the company included a software-based “defeat device” which changed how
the vehicle used the SCR system:
The software sensed when the car was being tested and then activated equipment that
reduced emissions, United States officials said. But the software turned the equipment
down during regular driving, increasing emissions far above legal limits, most likely to
save fuel or to improve the cars torque and acceleration.32
The fact that Volkswagen management was willing to risk billions of dollars in fines and
damage to the brand’s value for the sake of increasing performance (e.g., fuel efficiency) speaks to
30 On abatement costs see Diesel Retrofit Devices. EPA’s National Clean Diesel Campaign, 2013. http://www.epa.
gov/cleandiesel/technologies/retrofits.htm as well as our summary in Appendix C.
31 In 1994 euros this figure amounts to an increase in marginal cost of e3, 300 or 23.9% of the average (sales-weighted)
diesel retail price of e13,794 in our sample.
32 “How Volkswagens ‘Defeat Devices’ Worked.” New York Times. March 16, 2017.
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the importance of this channel towards selling diesel vehicles. The question then is: How big is
this change in performance? For the emissions scandal, evidence suggests that the modifications
required to bring diesels in compliance with the U.S. NOx standard decreases fuel efficiency (mpg)
6.8% on average. We therefore assume that under both the “None” and “EPA” cost scenarios
described above, meeting the stricter NOx emission standard we consider decreases fuel efficiency
(mpg) 6.8% and thereby decreases fuel economy (kpe). We view this as a likely lower bound on the
impact to performance since part of the benefit of diesels is also the (unobservable to us) increased
torque at low r.p.m. which is captured only in the diesel fixed effect and diesel-trend variable.
6.1 The Shrinking Popularity of Diesels Under Alternative Policies
We begin the analysis by evaluating how fuel taxation and emission standards affect the demand
for diesel automobiles. In Figure 8 we use the estimated model to show that switching to a less
diesel-friendly fuel tax or a more NOx stringent vehicle emission standard leads to significant
reductions in the popularity of diesels across the entire sample.
























































Notes: Bars reflect market share of diesels as a function of different fuel tax and vehicle emission policies.
In panel (a), we show that modifications to the fuel tax impacts the relative gasoline/diesel
fuel prices facing consumers and ultimately leads to a reduction in diesel sales. The uniform fuel
tax scenario where all fuels are taxed at the current higher gasoline tax increases the driving costs
of diesel vehicles and results in sizable reductions in diesel market share: ↓ 5.3%, ↓ 11.7%, and
↓ 8.3% in 1991, 1995, and 2000, respectively. These results are in-line with Grigolon, Reynaert
and Verboven (2017, Table 7) who predict that the 1998 diesel market share in Spain would have
decreased 9% had regulators increased the diesel fuel tax such that the price of diesel fuel matched
the price of gasoline.33
33 In contrast we allow for the cost of gasoline and diesel fuel to differ and instead equalize the fuel taxes leading to
a higher price of diesel fuel relative to gasoline (Figure 2).
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(d) Import Share (Vehicle Emissions)
Notes: Panels (a)-(b) present change in total profit for aggregate profits for European firms. Panels (c)-(d) reflect total import
share across time under different policies. “Data” corresponds to the import share observed in the data. Cuonterfactual
experiments are described in the text. We present the cumulative effects of both policies to European firm profits and import
share in Figure E.2.
Panel (b) shows smaller but qualitatively similar effects due to a stricter NOx vehicle
emissions policy. We begin by looking at the impact of such a standard when we assume automakers
could have met the stricter standard by modifying performance alone (i.e., “None”). Under this
scenario, diesel market share falls 2.2% in 1991 and 3.3% in 2000. When we also account for the
increased cost from attaching an abatement technology to the engine (i.e., “EPA”) firms optimally
choose to pass through some of this expense to consumers leading to higher diesel vehicle prices
and even lower penetration of diesel vehicles: decreasing 5.0% in 1991 and 8.8% in 2000.
In Figure 9 we evaluate financial implications of these policies to firms in order to identify
the beneficiaries of the observed pro-diesel policies. We focus on the share of imports and the
profits of European manufacturers to highlight how these pro-diesel policies soften competition by
directing demand away from gasoline imports towards diesel-powered domestic automobiles. From
panels (a) and (b) we see that instituting the alternative policies we consider decreases profits
for European firms significantly while import shares increase (panels c-d) as consumers substitute
away from domestic diesels and towards foreign (largely Asian) gasoline-powered vehicles. Put
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differently, Figure 9 demonstrates that European firms benefited significantly from both of the
pro-diesel policies employed by regulators. Moreover, these effects increased over time as domestic
automakers invested in developing their diesel fleets (i.e., Table 1).
6.2 Import Tariff Equivalence
Thus far we have shown that diesel vehicles were a popular choice among consumers and generated
substantial profits for European automakers, but much of this success was due to preferential fuel
taxes and vehicle emissions standards which shifted consumption and profits towards domestic firms.
In this section we use the model estimates to measure the tariff equivalence of these policies. We
do this in the following way. First, we solve for the pricing equilibrium when European regulators
choose the alternative policies we consider. Under this equilibrium we observe substitution towards
imported varieties Figure 9, panels (c-d). We then solve for the import tariff each year which
reduces equilibrium import share to the level we observe in the data, i.e., incentivizes consumers
to purchase local vehicles. We call this value the “import tariff equivalence” of the policies.
Table 3: Implicit Tariff by Year Across Policies
year official fuel tax emissions both
1991 18.80 21.72 21.38 23.22
1992 14.40 18.27 17.69 20.01
1993 10.30 14.96 14.09 17.12
1994 10.30 16.11 14.60 18.54
1995 10.30 17.67 15.60 20.55
1996 10.30 16.64 15.12 19.86
1997 10.30 18.07 15.94 22.03
1998 10.30 18.94 15.92 22.81
1999 10.30 21.69 17.91 27.36
2000 10.30 19.65 17.81 25.28
Notes: “Data” is the current import tariff on foreign imports. “Fuel Tax” corresponds
to the implicit import tariff for the observed fuel excise taxes. “Emissions” corresponds
to the implicit tariff for the observed emissions policy under the assumption that the
stricter NOx policy requires a e3,300 increase in marginal cost (“EPA”) and a 6.8%
reduction in fuel efficiency for all diesels. “Both” corresponds to the implicit tariff when
both policies are enforced simultaneously.
In Table 3 we present the import tariff equivalence of the pro-diesel policies employed by
the European Union. In the right-most column we present the tariff required to maintain import
market share observed in the data when regulators equalize fuel taxes and impose vehicle emission
standards which increase diesel marginal costs and decrease fuel efficiency 6.8% (i.e., “EPA”).34





34 Table E.3 further details the tariff-equivalence across vehicle emissions assumptions.
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Therefore, a 6.8% reduction in fuel efficiency (mpg) due to stricter fuel emission standards also
amounts to a 6.8% reduction in fuel economy (kpe). An increase in the diesel fuel excise tax
to match the higher gasoline excise tax impacts kpe differently, however, as such a tax change
increases the diesel “Fuel Price” leading to a reduction in diesel kpe. In our data equalizing fuel
taxes alone amounts to a 16.8% decrease in diesel kpe in 2000. If both policies, emissions and fuel
taxation, are implemented simultaneously in that year, the two effects compound and diesel fuel
economy (kpe) decreases 22.5%.
We find the implicit tariff from these policies ranges from 17.12% in 1993 to 27.36% in
1999. Thus, the cumulative impact of these policies amounted to a significant trade policy barrier
equivalent to imposing a tariff roughly two to three times the official rate (second column). In the
third and fourth columns we isolate the yearly contribution of each policy. To do so, we follow a
similar approach to the one outlined above but only change one policy at a time. We find that both
policies played important roles and amounted to quantitatively significant de facto non-tariff trade
policies during the 1990s though fuel taxes played an increasing role as the decade progressed.
Figure 10: Tariff Equivalence of E.U. Policy
























0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
 
Percent Reduction in Fuel Economy (KPE)
Implicit Tariff (%) as Diesel KPE Falls
(a) No Change in Marginal Cost (“None”)
























0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
 
Percent Reduction in Fuel Economy (KPE)
Implicit Tariff (%) as Diesel KPE Falls
(b) e3,300 Increase in Marginal Cost (“EPA”)
Notes: Implicit tariff required to limit the import share to 11.8% as we decrease fuel economy (kpe) do to changes in fuel
taxation and vehicle emission policies. In Panel (a) we consider the case where a stricter NOx vehicle emissions policy has
no effect on the marginal cost of producing diesels (i.e., “None” in the text) whereas in Panel (b) we assume the cost of
producing diesels increases e3,300. Vertical dashed lines correspond to estimated changes in fuel economy based on stricter
vehicle emissions policy (kpe ↓ 6.8% ), equalized fuel taxes (kpe ↓ 16.8%), or both (kpe ↓ 22.5%). Shaded areas correspond to
the 95% confidence interval. See Appendix D computational details. Results correspond to year 2000 when the official import
tariff was 10.3%.
Our calculation of the import tariff equivalence of EU policy depended upon these policies’
effect on diesel popularity via improved fuel economy (kpe) as well as changes in marginal cost to
meet more rigorous NOx vehicle emission standards. In Figure 10 we document that each of these
channels played a significant role in defending domestic industry. We do so by plotting the import
tariff in 2000 required to generate the import share we observe in the data, about 11.8% in 2000,
across different changes in fuel economy (x-axis). In panel (a) we present the case where more a
rigorous NOx vehicle emission policy does not impact the marginal cost of producing diesel vehicles
while in panel (b) we present the “EPA” scenario where these alternative standards increase the
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marginal cost of producing diesel vehicles e3,300. Thus, a zero percent change in kpe when the
alternative vehicle emission policy does not impact marginal costs amounts to the equilibrium we
observe in the data and the tariff is simply the official import tariff of 10.3 percent. Graphically,
this scenario is represented by the y-intercept in panel (a). The vertical dashed lines in each panel
correspond to the change in fuel economy implied by removing the the pro-diesel policies. Thus,
the intersection of the dashed lines with the solid line in panel (b) corresponds to the implicit tariffs
we presented in Table 3 for 2000. Shaded regions indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals of the
estimated implicit tariff. Inference is based on bootstrapping simulations using the demand and
cost estimates from Table 2. See Appendix D for details.
In both panels we find an implicit tariff which is statistically greater than the official 10.3%
rate for all reductions in fuel economy. Moreover, we again find that both the fuel taxation and
vehicle emission policies employed by European regulators amounted to large and statistically-
significant non-trade policies and that together these effects compound. If we focus only on panel (a)
and ignore the possibility that changes in policy would have likely impacted vehicle production
costs, we find that reductions in the fuel economy of diesel vehicles alone played a large and
statistically-significant role in promoting domestic industry. As both preferential fuel taxes and a
weak NOx emission standard increased the fuel economy of diesel vehicles, panel (a) demonstrates
that these policies promoted diesel vehicles by increasing their fuel economy absent changes in the
marginal of producing diesels
In panel (b) we redo the analysis assuming a more rigorous NOx vehicle emission standard
would have increased the marginal cost of producing diesel vehicles by e3,300. We observe an
upward shift in the line relative to panel (a) indicating that increasing the marginal cost of producing
diesel vehicles leads to higher equilibrium prices causing consumers to shift consumption from
domestic diesels towards foreign gasoline-powered imports. For example, if we ignore the role of
changes in fuel economy due to changes in policy (set ∆kpe to zero), we find that changes in
diesel marginal cost would have generated sufficient substitution towards foreign imports that only
by increasing the import tariff from 10.3% to 14.4% (i.e., the solid line’s y-intercept) could EU
regulators have maintained data import share at 11.8%. We conclude that a weak NOx emission
policy promoted diesels by also decreasing their production costs leading to lower prices for price-
sensitive consumers.
6.3 Consumer Welfare
Thus far our analysis has focused on the impact of pro-diesel regulations on market shares of
imported automobiles in Europe and on the increased profits of domestic auto makers. In this
section we evaluate the impact of these policies to consumer welfare which we define as mean
compensating variation, i.e., the average amount of money required to make consumers indifferent
when we institute alternative fuel tax and vehicle emission policies and recompute the equilibrium.
As our demand model allows for income effects, we solve for compensating variation accounting
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Table 4: Government Policy and Consumer Welfare
alternative policies alternative policies + tariff
year none epa none epa
1991 e 28.74 (0.21%) e 72.51 (0.54%) e 267.57 (1.99%) e 519.15 (3.85%)
1992 43.91 (0.32%) 124.65 (0.91%) 327.16 (2.38%) 635.56 (4.62%)
1993 73.86 (0.50%) 192.62 (1.30%) 344.45 (2.32%) 698.84 (4.70%)
1994 113.15 (0.69%) 277.18 (1.68%) 558.36 (3.39%) 1,036.62 (6.29%)
1995 157.31 (0.91%) 399.56 (2.31%) 747.87 (4.32%) 1,359.47 (7.86%)
1996 183.67 (1.03%) 484.19 (2.71%) 555.44 (3.11%) 1,102.95 (6.17%)
1997 233.00 (1.32%) 609.96 (3.46%) 643.97 (3.66%) 1,259.29 (7.15%)
1998 313.26 (1.80%) 816.54 (4.69%) 1,836.33 (10.55%) 2,991.68 (17.18%)
1999 417.43 (2.40%) 1,048.13 (6.03%) 1,011.58 (5.82%) 1,957.05 (11.25%)
2000 402.24 (2.26%) 1,135.93 (6.38%) 1,238.16 (6.95%) 2,424.79 (13.61%)
Average e 196.66 (1.14%) e 516.13 (3.00%) e 772.39 (4.45%) e 1,419.45 (8.27%)
Notes: Table depicts mean compensating variation measured in 1994 euros under different abatement
cost assumptions where a positive value indicates the average consumer is better-off under the observed
pro-diesel policies. Values in parentheses correspond to mean compensating variation as a percent of
median retail price in the data. Compensating variation in “Alternative Policies + Tariff” also includes
lump sum payment for increased tariff revenue.
for both income and substitution effects following Dagsvik and Karlström (2005). A positive
value indicates that consumers would be willing to pay the government to stay in the estimated
equilibrium, i.e., they prefer the fuel taxation and vehicle emission policy we observe.
In Table 4 we present the welfare effects to consumers of pro-diesel policy relative to two
policy regimes. In the columns marked “Alternative Policies” we compare the current pro-diesel
policy to a regime where policymakers both harmonize fuel taxes and introduce a stricter NOx
emissions standard which reduces fuel efficiency 6.8%. These columns therefore refer to the
consumer welfare effects in Section 6.1 where we documented that these hypothetical fuel taxation
and vehicle emission policies cause consumers to switch from diesels and towards imported cars.
Our conclusion is that the average European consumer is better-off each year under the
current policies. This is not surprising since the alternative policies we consider both decrease fuel
economy (due to higher diesel fuel taxes and a reduction in diesel fuel efficiency) and may increase
the retail price of diesels (due to “EPA” abatement costs). These negative welfare effects grow
over time as diesels become increasingly popular. In terms of relative magnitudes the change in
welfare amounts to 1.14% of median retail price on average when cost of modifying diesel engines
are nil, though the relative impact is nearly double at the end of the decade when diesels are
clearly dominant in several automobile segments. If meeting the alternative emissions standards
requires positive abatement costs (column “EPA”) automakers will pass some of this increase in
marginal costs of producing diesels to consumers. Consequently, adopting these alternative polices
decreases consumer surplus further and drivers will be even better off under the current pro-diesel
policy, about 3% of median retail price on average though again the effect grows over the decade
to over double that gain. Put differently, the benefits of not adopting these alternative policies to
consumers increase by a factor of three when we also account for changes in marginal cost.
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In Section 6.2 we calculated the tariff-equivalence of the observed pro-diesel policies. One
could interpret this equilibrium as the consequence of a regulator uses only tariffs to manage
imports. In “Alternative Policies + Tariff” we evaluate the consumer welfare effects of this policy.
For simplicity we assume that incremental tariff revenue is returned to consumers as a lump sum
payment. Now the impact to consumer welfare is more severe as regulation not only limits the
popularity of diesel cars but also increase the retail prices of foreign imports.
Measuring the full effect to consumers requires accounting for negative health externalities
due to greater NOx but reduced CO2 emissions. If these externalities are large then providing
incentives to purchase diesel vehicles may adversely affect consumers and reverse the conclusions
from Table 4.35 This is particularly true for NOx emissions since externalities such as smog tend
to affect local populations. If we assume that regulators are not captured by domestic industry
and that they do consider both the externality and consumer welfare when instituting policy, the
fact we observe these pro-diesel policies supports the idea that these policies do serve a legitimate
purpose: to promote a new technology, the turbodiesel, which turned out to be popular among
domestic consumers and happened to be produced by domestic firms. The impact of these policies
on foreign firms – their tariff-equivalence – would therefore amount to an unintended consequence.
In summary, we have shown that the European fuel taxation and vehicle emission policies
favored diesels, amounted to a significant non-tariff trade policy, and benefited consumers provided
externalities were sufficiently small. We conclude this section by asking: Did these policies violate
WTO rules? The WTO considers a policy a non-tariff barrier (NTB) only if the policy is not “set at
an appropriate level to achieve legitimate objectives with minimum impact on trade” (OECD, 2005)
but European regulators could claim the policies did serve a legitimate objective: they benefited
consumers. These results therefore highlight the difficulty of prosecuting such policies in the WTO
as proving they amount to a non-tariff barrier is difficult absent a compelling piece of evidence.
6.4 Robustness
In this paper we find significant evidence to support the hypothesis that European fuel taxation
and vehicle emissions regulation had the effect of protecting the domestic European automobile
industry. Our analysis does come with caveats, however. First, the estimated model is static so we
cannot account for the long-term effects of the alternative policies we considered. If we interpret
the increasing valuation of diesels throughout the sample (i.e., β̂diesel× trend > 0) as customer
learning, a small modification of the diesel fuel tax (or equivalently a small decrease in the NOx
vehicle emission standard) early in our sample could have limited the diffusion of diesels later in the
sample. Our results would then amount to a lower bound of the impact of these policies. Second,
in evaluating the impact of a stricter NOx emission standard we account only for reductions in
fuel efficiency though evidence suggest that torque is also effected by the abatement technology.
35 Measuring the externality explicitly in our context is however difficult since it would require measuring changes in
driving habits as a function of full prices and fuel economy.
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Unfortunately, our data do not include engine torque so its contribution towards the popularity of
diesel vehicles can only be captured via the diesel and diesel-trend variables.
Finally, our results however depend upon the strong assumption that the set of car models
(and their corresponding characteristics) would not have changed had European regulators adopted
different fuel taxation and vehicle emissions standards. The goal of the analysis of this section is to
convince the reader that other strategies not based on the sales of diesel automobiles would have
been less profitable for the European industry. European automakers had an exclusive expertise in
the production of diesel engines and the pro-diesel policies of European authorities reinforced this
advantage by diverting demand away from imported fuel efficient gasoline vehicles.
There are many ways in which European firms could have responded to alternative fuel
taxation and vehicle emission standards. Given the fact that consumers prefer fuel efficient vehicles
(β̂kpe > 0), we test whether European firms could have invested in redesigning their gasoline-
powered vehicles to compensate for lost diesel profits due to the alternative fuel taxation and
vehicle emission standards we considered above. As in our calculation of the implicit tariff, we begin
from the counterfactual equilibrium where regulators chose to not adopt the pro-diesel policies and
instead adopted the alternative fuel taxation and emission policies we considered. As we showed
in Figure 9 such policies decrease the profits of European firms. We then unilaterally solve for the
increase fuel efficiency, mpg, of European gasoline-powered cars each year required to offset the
reduction of diesel profits. We also account for changes in firm costs due to changes in c90 as well
as changes in vehicle prices (i.e., we resolve Equation (8) at the new vector of characteristics). It
is important to note that this exercise may not generate equilibria which correspond to the Nash













































Notes: Graph depicts (sales-weighted) average gasoline fuel efficiency re-
quired for European firms to earn as much profit as estimated in the data.
A similar pattern exists when comparing the simple average. In each coun-
terfactual experiment we assume harmonized fuel taxes as described in the
text.
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equilibria of a game in which firms choose characteristics, however. Instead we view this exercise
as a simple way to explore whether such modifications would have been feasible.
Figure 11 reports the (sales-weighted) average mileage of the current fleet in 1991, 1995, and
2000 and compares it to the required mileage for European gasoline models that will compensate the
foregone diesel profits under the “None” and the more expensive “EPA” vehicle emission scenarios.
In both scenarios we assume regulators harmonize the fuel taxes charged to diesel and gasoline.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to the “EPA” scenario and note that “None” amounts to an
intermediate case.
At the beginning of the 1990s, when diesels generated only 13.5% of European profits, firms
could offset foregone profits from diesels by increasing the fuel efficiency of their gasoline fleet from
45.1 to 47.2 miles per gallon, a 4.7% increase. By the end of the decade – when diesels accounted for
59.3% of European firm profits – recovering the foregone profits from diesels would have required a
33.4% increase in gasoline vehicle fuel efficiency, from 41.9 to 55.9 miles per gallon. This is less than
the increase in fuel efficiency expected by European authorities between 2015 and 2021, from 45 to
68 miles per gallon, respectively. It seems reasonable to assume that such levels of fuel efficiency
were out of reach in the 1990s. Thus, the pro-diesel policies simply reinforced the most profitable
product strategies available to European automakers.
7 Concluding Remarks
The goal in this paper was to estimate the tariff equivalence of two European domestic policies which
favored the domestic automobile industry. To do so we estimated an equilibrium oligopoly model of
differentiated products. Our estimation allowed for significant heterogeneity of preferences, finding
that consumers favored fuel economy, were price-sensitive, and increased their valuations of diesel
vehicles over the sample period.
We find that the pro-diesel fuel tax and vehicle emissions policies employed by the E.U.
amounted to significant trade policies which we estimate to be equivalent to a 17% to 27% import
tariff. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first use of a structural equilibrium model of
demand and industry oligopoly competition to show that seemingly innocuous domestic policies
can be an effective replacement for traditional trade policies. Our results illustrate that in an
increasingly global economy, governments can effectively construct non-trade national policies,
including environmental regulations, to protect domestic industries when traditional trade policies
are no longer available. We further showed that both consumers and domestic manufacturers
benefited under these policies provided any health or environmental externalities are negligible.
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To control for household income distribution a thousand individuals are sampled each year from
the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (Base 1987 for years 1992-1997 and Base 1997
for years 1998-2000) conducted by INE, the Spanish Statistical Agency.36 The outside option varies
significantly during the 1990s due to the important recession between 1992 and 1994 and the very
fast growth of the economy and population (immigration) in the second half of the decade. We also
use these consumer surveys to set the size of the outside option for each year in our sample which
we compute as the total number of households minus the total number of new car registrations.
Starting with 1991, the outside market share s0t is: 0.93, 0.92, 0.94, 0.93, 0.93, 0.93, 0.92, 0.91,
0.89, and 0.89, respectively.
Fuel prices were also obtained from INE. We obtained Spanish steel prices, spi, from the
2001 edition of Iron and Steel Statistics – Data 1991-2000 published by the European Commission
(Table 8.1).
For the analysis of demand we build a data set using prices and vehicle characteristics
as reported by La gúıa del comprador de coches, ed. Moredi, Madrid. We select the price and
characteristics of the mid-range version of each model, i.e., the most popular and commonly sold.
Demand estimation also makes use of segment dummies. Other than the luxury segment, which
also includes sporty cars, our car segments follow the “Euro Car Segment” definition described
in Section IV of “Case No. COMP/M.1406 - Hyundai/Kia.” Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89:
Merger Procedure Article 6(1)(b) Decision. Brussels, 17 March 1999. CELEX Database Document
No. 399M1406.
Until Spain ended its accession to the European Union transition period in 1992, it was
allowed to charge import duties on European products. Similarly, import duties for non-European
products converged to European levels. European imports paid tax duty of 4.4% in 1992, and
nothing thereafter. Non-European manufacturers had to pay 14.4% and 10.3%, respectively.
Thus, for the estimation of the equilibrium random coefficient discrete choice model of Table 2
we distinguish between prices paid by consumers (p) and those chosen by manufacturers (pw) .
The other relevant factor that changes during the 1990s is the ownership structure of
automobile firms. During this decade fiat acquired alfa romeo and lancia; ford acquired
volvo; and gm acquired saab. bmw acquired rover in 1994 but sold it in May 2000 (with the
exception of the “Mini” brand) so these are treated as separate firms. Table A.1 describes the
ownership structure at the beginning and end of the decade.
36 See http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?L=1&type=pcaxis&path=/t25/p458&file=inebase for a description of
these databases.
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Table A.1: Automobile Groups: 1992 vs. 2000
Year 1992 Year 2000
Firm Gasoline Diesel Owner Gasoline Diesel Owner
alfa romeo 5,038 64 alfa romeo 2,941 3,983 fiat
audi 16,689 1,982 volkswagen 15,273 24,184 volkswagen
bmw 17,855 1,906 bmw 13,683 15,838 bmw
chrysler 1,243 – 5,941 2,389
citroën 68,890 36,851 psa 46,420 111,694 psa
daewoo – – 25,201 –
fiat 35,677 5,733 fiat 30,557 17,967 fiat
ford 121,140 17,468 ford 55,268 57,013 ford
honda 4,805 – 8,782 1,072
hyundai 2,704 – 30,150 3,590
kia – – 9,778 1,387
lancia 11,117 905 lancia 2,206 2,126 fiat
mazda 3,064 – 2,205 1,480
mercedes 9,352 4,129 mercedes 13,953 10,684 mercedes
mitsubishi 3,041 – 3,660 1,013
nissan 16,010 905 17,855 21,971
opel 110,286 11,099 gm 66,488 75,418 gm
peugeot 61,323 35,494 psa 55,371 92,496 psa
renault 147,907 27,448 renault 76,925 99,360 renault
rover 15,255 425 rover 10,173 8,491 rover
saab 1,551 – saab 1,867 2,424 gm
seat 85,773 11,787 volkswagen 58,072 109,447 volkswagen
skoda 724 – skoda 5,003 10,385 volkswagen
suzuki 2,058 – 3,250 486
toyota 4,425 – 16,827 3,584
volkswagen 50,561 5,471 volkswagen 47,125 50,296 volkswagen
volvo 10,179 – volvo 7,379 3,566 ford
Notes: Sales of vehicle by manufacturer and fuel type. “Owner” indicates the name of the automobile
group with direct control on production and pricing. Those without a group are all non-European
manufacturers and defined as non-eu in the analysis.
Table A.2: Car Model Characteristics Across Segments
1991 models share price size hpw c90 mpg kpe
small 26 39.69 7.88 62.55 3.63 4.68 50.66 34.86
compact 31 34.84 10.83 74.28 3.98 5.31 45.02 31.57
sedan 34 18.88 14.50 80.32 4.40 5.71 41.74 29.69
luxury 36 6.46 22.94 85.88 4.79 6.44 37.03 25.60
minivan 2 0.13 20.88 85.16 3.61 7.11 33.56 24.12
all 129 100.00 11.15 71.53 3.97 5.21 46.11 32.13
2000 models share price size hpw c90 mpg kpe
small 49 32.75 10.42 66.36 3.18 4.86 49.11 31.61
compact 56 34.43 14.86 76.54 3.59 5.00 48.15 32.53
sedan 52 25.97 19.45 81.92 3.63 5.26 45.72 31.60
luxury 40 3.72 34.53 89.72 5.17 6.72 36.46 23.31
minivan 32 3.13 20.80 83.47 3.16 6.39 37.89 25.91
all 229 100.00 15.52 75.31 3.51 5.13 47.07 31.43
Notes: See definitions in Table 1.
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B Japanese Automobile Sales in Europe
In our analysis we treat all Japanese production as imported even though some models were
produced in the E.U. even before the beginning of our sample. Thus, for instance, Nissan established
in the U.K. in 1984 and Toyota and Honda in 1989. We argue that: (i) Most Japanese vehicles sold
in the European automobile market during the 1990s were imported from Japan, (ii) Out of those
produced in Europe, many were light trucks not included in our sample, and (iii) those produced
in Europe could not avoid paying import tariffs because local value added was considered too low
to qualify as domestic production by European rules until year 2000.
During the 1990s Japanese automakers tried to avoid E.U. import tariffs through the
establishment of factories in the U.K. and later in partnership with other manufacturers in a
strategy known as “Transplant Japanese Production.” To avoid import tariffs, Japanese firms had
to demonstrate that their models contained a sufficient amount of “local content.” In France, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain this amounted to 80% of value added had to be from European sources –
a stringent standard set at the request of European automakers.37 In the U.K. and Germany a
threshold of 60% was accepted as appropriate. Seidenfuss and Kathawala (2010) document that
these demanding requirements were active until 1999.
Table B.1: Japanese Models Produced in the E.U.
Toyota* Nissan Nissan Honda Mitsubishi**
(UK) (UK) (Spain) (UK) (Netherlands)
Carina (1992-1996) Primera (1992-2000) Patrol (1992-2000) Accord (1992-2000) Carisma (1992-2000)
Avensis (1997-2000) Micra (1992-2000) Terrano (1992-2000) Civic (1994-2000) Space Star (1998-2000)
Corolla (1997-2000) Almera (1998-2000) Serena (1997-2000)
Almera (1999-2000)
Other Light Vehicles
Notes: (*) Production in France started in 2001; (**) Mitshubishi also produced in Spain but only manufactured
trucks and engines. In Netherlands Mitsubishi produced in a joint venture with Volvo. Source: Japan Automobile
Manufactures Association.
Table B.1 presents car models manufactured by Toyota, Nissan, Honda, and Mitsubishi,
the most important Japanese firms in Europe at the time, e.g., Kato (1997). The U.K. was the
country where more Japanese passenger models were produced. Since the UK Government was less
demanding in the application of the “local content” requirement, most of the production was also
sold there. Before year 2000, when these models were sold in Spain, they had to face the European
import tax duty rate – generally 10.3% during the sample.
In any case, the share of Japanese produced vehicles in Europe is very small. To document
it we collected information on European production of those transplant factories for our sample
period (1991-2000). Available data for production do not distinguish by brand and aggregate
passenger cars and light trucks. Since some transplant factories operated on joint venture with
37 This local content commitment by Japanese firms in the E.U. is far higher than corresponding amount in the USA,
e.g., Hoon Hyun (2008).
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European companies, European production of Japanese vehicles is estimated as the difference
between European registrations, given by ACEA, and Japanese exports to Europe, given by the
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, JAMA. Table B.2 documents the yearly production
of Japanese automobiles in Europe during the 1990s, including both passenger cars and light
trucks (that we do not include in our analysis). From 1994 to 1999, the total Transplant Japanese
production represented only 34% of total Japanese sales in Europe.
Table B.2: European production of Japanese Companies
Year Exports Registrations Production Production
(1) (2) (2) – (1) on sales (%)
1991 1,496,263 1,673,575 177,312 10.59
1992 1,410,488 1,598,169 187,681 11.74
1993 1,115,491 1,381,085 265,594 19.23
1994 900,304 1,303,502 403,198 30.93
1995 782,240 1,287,183 504,943 39.23
1996 818,644 1,385,880 567,236 40.93
1997 1,081,482 1,566,067 484,585 30.94
1998 1,192,802 1,706,119 513,317 30.09
1999 1,182,269 1,733,618 551,349 31.80
2000 1,004,224 1,676,311 672,087 40.09
Note: Passenger cars and light vehicles are included. Source: JAMA and ACEA.
C EPA Cost Estimates for Abatement Diesel Vehicles
The following information was taken from “Diesel Retrofit Devices.” Environmental Protection
Agency (http://www.epa.gov/cleandiesel/technologies/retrofits.htm), last updated Jan-
uary 23, 2013. As described in the text, the abatement technology we consider is the “Lean NOx
Catalyst (LNC)” as this technology is most relevant for limiting NOx emissions in passenger cars.
Our inclusion of the remaining technologies recommended by the EPA shows both the breadth of
technologies available to reduce a variety of emissions as well as the variety of costs (of which the
LNC is near the bottom) required to modify a vehicle.
Diesel retrofit devices for after-treatment pollution control can be installed on new or
existing vehicles and equipment to reduce particulate matter (PM), nitrogen oxides (NOx), hydro-
carbons (HC), or carbon monoxide (CO) as well as other air pollutants. The information below
provides estimated emission reductions.
Lean NOx Catalyst (LNC). Lean NOx Catalysts (LNC) use diesel fuel injected into the exhaust
stream to create a catalytic reaction and reduce pollution. Verified LNCs are paired with either a
DPF (Diesel Particulate Filter) or a DOC (Diesel Oxidation Catalyst). An LNC can also be paired
with an active DPF to reduce NOx emissions and enable filter regeneration over a range of duty
cycles. However, an LNC still requires specific exhaust temperatures for appropriate NOx emission
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Table C.1: Estimated Costs to Modify Diesel Vehicles
Typical NOx
Technology Emission Reduction Typical Cost ($)
Lean NOx Catalyst (LNC) 5-40% $6,500-$10,000
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) <75% $10,000-$20,000; Urea $0.80/ gallon
Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency.
control performance. LNCs can increase fuel usage by 5-7 percent (emphasis added).
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR). Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) Systems inject a re-
ductant, also known as diesel exhaust fluid (DEF), into the exhaust stream where it reacts with a
catalyst to convert NOx emissions to N
2 (nitrogen gas) and oxygen. The catalytic reaction requires
certain temperature criteria for NOx reduction to occur. As with DPFs, knowing the age and type
of each engine in the fleet as well as the drive cycles of the vehicles is important. Data logging
must be performed to determine if the exhaust gas temperatures meet the specific SCR system
requirements.
Figure C.1: Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR)
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Notes: Diagram depicts the typical operation of a SCR system. The DEF sets off a
chemical reaction that converts nitrogen oxide (NOx) into nitrogen, water and small
amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) which are then expelled through the vehicle tailpipe.
Source: www.dieselforum.org.
SCR systems require periodic refilling of the DEF by the car owner. SCR systems are
commonly used in conjunction with a DOC and/or DPF to reduce PM emissions. Because of
new NOx standards, most 2010 and newer on-highway diesel engines come equipped with an SCR
system. A DEF refueling infrastructure is in place, facilitating the use of SCRs. Inclusion of an
SCR system adds weight to the vehicle thereby decreasing fuel efficiency (mpg) while also adding
complexity to the diesel engine.
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D Solving for the Implicit Tariff
In this section we provide computational details regarding solving for the import tariff equivalence
of the pro-diesel fuel taxation and vehicle emission policies employed European regulators. For
simplicity we describe the process to solve for the import tariff for a given year.
1. We begin by adjusting consumer demand and firm marginal costs according to the policy
considered. For instance, when evaluating the joint impact of fuel taxation and vehicle
emissions policy where the latter requires a e3,300 increase in marginal cost for each diesel
(i.e., what we call “EPA” in the main text), we decrease fuel economy 22.5% in 2000 to
capture both more expensive diesel fuel prices and the reduction in fuel efficiency due to the
stricter emissions standard. We also increase the marginal cost of all diesel vehicles e3,300.
We do not adjust marginal cost to reflect changes in fuel efficiency, however.
2. Solve for the pricing equilibrium by solving the system of firm FOCs represented by equa-
tion (8). Since there exists no guarantee that a unique solution satisfies this system of
equations, we begin each search from a variety of different initial guesses. In practice, we
found the solution to the system of FOCs was robust to the initial guess. We then record the
import share at the new equilibrium prices.
3. Solve for the tariff which drives import share back down to the level observed in the data
(e.g., 11.8% in 2000). This requires solving the pricing equilibrium for each potential import
tariff.
We constructed the 95% confidence intervals of Figure 10 via bootstrap where we used the
point estimates and standard errors for the demand and cost parameters (Table 2) to construct a
random sample (N=1,000) of demand and cost estimates. To ease computation, we restricted the
bootstrap to be over the nonlinear parameters {α,Σ, ν}. For each bootstrap sample n = 1, . . . , 1000,
we begin with a set of parameters drawn from the empirical distributions defined by Table 2. Define
θ̃n = {αn,Σn, νn} as the bootstrap parameters for sample n. We recover the remaining parameters
{βn, γn} following the solution method outlined in Section 5.38 Consequently, each bootstrap
simulation n generates predicted market shares which match the data by construction.39
For each sample n and year t we solve for the import tariff equivalence of the pro-diesel
fuel taxation and vehicle emission policies using the approach outlined above and the parameter
vector {αn,Σn, νn, βn, γn}. The final product is a large set of implicit import tariffs which vary
not only by fuel economy (kpe) and diesel marginal costs (“None” versus “EPA”) but also by
{αn,Σn, νn, βn, γn}. We construct the 95% confidence interval for each year as the range between
the 2.5% and 97.5% quartiles, i.e., the middle 95%.
38 First solve for the mean utilities δ(θ̃n) such that bootstrap sample n generates predicted shares equal to those
observed in the data. We then recover mean utility demand β(θ̃n) and cost γ(θ̃n) parameters via linear projection.
39 One sees this fact in Figure 10, Panel (a) where the confidence interval converges to zero as ∆kpe ↓ 0 (i.e., as we
converge to the data equilibrium) and the implicit tariff converges to the official import tariff rate of 10.3%.
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E Additional Results































































































































































































Notes: Figure presents estimated brand fixed effect in demand (panel a) and production (panel b). Results are presented















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E.2: Estimated Best Substitutes (Select Products)
Best Substitute
Owner Name Segment Owner Name Segment Elasticity
Ford ESCORT - Diesel Compact Seat MALAGA - Diesel Compact 0.2366
Peugeot 306 - Diesel Compact Rover SERIE 100 - Diesel Small 0.1810
Renault MEGANE - Diesel Compact Hyundai LANTRA - Diesel Compact 0.2194
Ford ESCORT - Gas Compact Rover MONTEGO - Gas Luxury 0.1456
Opel ASTRA - Gas Compact Suzuki SWIFT - Gas Small 0.1328
Renault MEGANE - Gas Compact Rover 25 - Gas Compact 0.1896
Audi A6 - Diesel Luxury Opel SINTRA - Diesel Minivan 0.1295
BMW SERIE 5 - Diesel Luxury Mercedes S Serie 4 - Diesel Luxury 0.2866
Mercedes E SERIE 300 - Diesel Luxury Opel SINTRA - Diesel Minivan 0.3805
Audi 100 - Gas Luxury Renault 25 - Gas Luxury 0.0653
BMW SERIE 5 - Gas Luxury Mercedes S SERIE 500 - Gas Luxury 0.1788
Hyundai H.COUPE - Gas Luxury Nissan 200 SX - Gas Luxury 0.0843
Chrysler VOYAGER - Diesel Minivan Mazda MPV - Diesel Minivan 0.0715
Opel ZAFIRA - Diesel Minivan Hyundai H-1 - Diesel Minivan 0.0441
Renault ESPACE - Diesel Minivan Hyundai H-1 - Diesel Minivan 0.0336
Chrysler VOYAGER - Gas Minivan Chrysler 300M - Gas Luxury 0.0467
Mercedes SerieA - Gas Minivan Daewoo TACUMA - Gas Minivan 0.0097
Opel ZAFIRA - Gas Minivan Hyundai H-1 - Gas Minivan 0.0399
Citroen XANTIA - Diesel Sedan Hyundai H-1 - Diesel Minivan 0.1789
Citroen XSARA - Diesel Sedan Hyundai H-1 - Diesel Minivan 0.2503
Seat TOLEDO - Diesel Sedan Ford FOCUS - Diesel Compact 0.0895
Ford MONDEO - Gas Sedan Rover MONTEGO - Gas Luxury 0.1033
Opel VECTRA - Gas Sedan Chrysler VISION - Gas Luxury 0.1018
Seat TOLEDO - Gas Sedan VW JETTA - Gas Compact 0.0909
Peugeot 205 - Diesel Small Citroen AX - Diesel Small 0.1589
Renault CLIO - Diesel Small Seat AROSA - Diesel Small 0.1200
Seat IBIZA - Diesel Small Seat AROSA - Diesel Small 0.1889
Opel CORSA - Gas Small Seat MARBELLA - Gas Small 0.1031
Renault CLIO - Gas Small Suzuki SWIFT - Gas Small 0.1582
Seat IBIZA - Gas Small Skoda FORMAN - Gas Small 0.1271
Notes: Table presents the best substitute for select products. We define the best substitute as the product with the
greatest average estimated cross-price elasticity. Sample of products correspond to the three most popular products
in each segment, engine-type pair. Entries sorted according to segment, engine-type, and finally owner.
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(c) Import Share (Fuel Tax + Emissions)
Notes: Panel (a) presents change in total profit for European firms when fuel taxes are harmonized and regulators impose the
stricter NOx emissions standards. Panel (b) compares diesel market share across policies. Panel (c) presents total import share
across time under the different policies. “Data” corresponds to the import share observed in the data.
Table E.3: Implicit Tariff by Year Across Policies
none epa
year data fuel tax emissions both emissions both
1991 18.80 21.72 20.02 22.31 21.38 23.22
1992 14.40 18.27 16.03 19.03 17.69 20.01
1993 10.30 14.96 12.20 15.88 14.09 17.12
1994 10.30 16.11 12.58 17.25 14.60 18.54
1995 10.30 17.67 13.03 19.06 15.60 20.55
1996 10.30 16.64 12.71 18.09 15.12 19.86
1997 10.30 18.07 13.22 19.94 15.94 22.03
1998 10.30 18.94 13.38 20.90 15.92 22.81
1999 10.30 21.69 14.34 24.45 17.91 27.36
2000 10.30 19.65 14.10 22.47 17.81 25.28
Notes: “Data” is the current import tariff on foreign imports. “Fuel Tax” corresponds to the implicit
import tariff for the observed fuel excise taxes (i.e., “Equalize” in the main text). “Emissions”
corresponds to the implicit tariff for the observed emissions policy under the assumption that the
stricter NOx policy requires a e3,300 increase in marginal cost (“EPA”) and a 6.8% reduction in fuel
efficiency for all diesels. “Both” corresponds to the implicit tariff when both policies are enforced
simultaneously.
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